Manufacturer  Warranty in Louisiana by Getten, Thomas F.
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 33 | Number 4
ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice - A
Student Symposium
Summer 1973
"Manufacturer" Warranty in Louisiana
Thomas F. Getten
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas F. Getten, "Manufacturer" Warranty in Louisiana, 33 La. L. Rev. (1973)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol33/iss4/20
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
"MANUFACTURM" WARRANTY IN LOUISIANA
Plaintiff purchased an imported automobile and immediately
thereafter found it unsuitable for use. After futile efforts to
obtain correction of the deficiencies, plaintiff sued the car dealer
and the American distributor for return of the purchase price
only. The district court set aside the sale with judgment against
the dealer alone. The Louisiana supreme court found that where
the distributor assumed total responsibility for marketing the
vehicles and for selling, servicing, and establishing dealerships,
it occupied the position of manufacturer insofar as the Amer-
ican consumer was concerned. Therefore, the court held the
distributor, as a "manufacturer," liable in solido with the dealer
for the breach of its implied warranty. Media Production Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc., 262 La.
80, 262 So.2d 377 (1972).
The supreme court further seems to have expanded the
liability of a manufacturer by allowing "a consumer without
privity to recover, whether the suit be strictly in tort or upon
implied warranty [of quality]."' Previous to Media, beginning
in 1911, Louisiana courts had held the manufacturer of food
products liable to the consumer for unwholesome goods through
delictual liability.2 Early cases involving contaminated soft
drinks applied the rule of res ipsa loquitur 5 Subsequent to these
decisions, the supreme court in LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola
Bottling Co.4 held that a manufacturer of food products warrants
his product for wholesomeness to the consumer. No longer was
the plaintiff required to prove the bottle of soft drink had not
1. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc.,
262 La. 80, 90, 262 So.2d 377, 381 (1972).
2. McCauley v. Manda Bros. Prov. Co., 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d 637 (1968)
(concurring opinion); but see Givens v. Baton Rouge Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 182 So.2d 532 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
3. Res ipsa loquitur was applied primarily in the area of bottled soft
drinks containing foreign or deleterious substances. To recover for injuries
sustained, the consumer was required to prove that (1) the beverage con-
tained the substance, (2) actual damage was suffered by consuming the
drink, and (3) the bottle had not been tampered with after it left the
bottler's possession. Day v. Hammond Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 53 So.2d 447
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1951); Nichols v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 46
So.2d 695 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1951); Rowton v. Ruston Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 17 So.2d 851 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944); White v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
16 So.2d 579 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944); Jenkins v. Bogalusa Coca-Cola Bottling
Co., 1 So.2d 426 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1941); Gunter v. Alexandria Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 197 So. 159 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1940).
4. 221 La. 919, 60 So.2d 873 (1952).
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been tampered with, as required by the rule .of resipsa loquitur;
consumption of a beverage contaminated with foreign matter
established a prima facie case for assessment of damages against
the manufacturer. No contractual relationship was required, the
only requirement being to show the soft drink was in fact bottled
by the alleged manufacturer.5 Underlying the foodstuffs cases
is the presumption that a manufacturer knows of the unwhole-
someness of its product and therefore is at fault, even though
the manufacturer may not be proved negligent.6 This finding of
imputed negligence satisfies the fault requirement of Civil Code
article 2315.7
The manufacturer's delictual warranty to the purchaser was
extended beyond food products in Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty
Insurance Co.,8 where a manufacturer of cattle dip was found
liable for a defective chemical mix. The court required the plain-
tiff only to prove the defect created a risk of hazard in normal
use and the causal relationship between the defect and injury.9
If the product is proved hazardous in normal use, then the manu-
facturer is liable for damages to any person, whether purchaser
or other consumer. Therefore, after Weber, a manufacturer of a
product which involves a risk of injury warrants its product for
any loss to persons or other property caused by the products,
i.e., extrinsic damages. It would seem, however, if the product
did not involve a risk of injury or the product was simply un-
suitable for use (merely defective) then the delictual warranty
would not exist.
In contrast with the manufacturer's delictual warranty, the
contractual warranty of quality requires privity of contract, so
that an action in redhibition must be brought by the vendee
5. See, e.g., Paul v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 254 So.2d 690 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971).
6. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963);
Soileau v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 302 F..Supp. 119 (W.D. La. 1969); McCauley
v. Manda Bros. Prov. Co., 202 So.2d 492 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Stone,
Tort Doctrine in Louisiana: The Concept of Fault, 27 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1952).
7. McCauley v. Manda Bros. Prov. Co., 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d 637 (1968)
(concurring opinion); Marine Ins. Co. v. Strecker, 243 La. 522, 100 So.2d 493
(1958).
8. 259 La. 599, 250 So.2d 754 (1971).
9. A defect in the product exists if the product when used In Its Intended
manner causes harm and the manufacturer can produce no evidence to
rebut the presumption of negligence beyond the precautionary measures
taken In the manufacturing process. Circumstantial evidence is admissible
for the plaintiff to establish his proof. See Note, 33 LA. L. RE.v. 151 (1972).
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against the vendor.10 This warranty of quality is based on the
10. The supreme court, in dicta, relaxed the privity of contract require-
ment for the contractual warranty in McEachern v. Plauche Lmbr. &
Constr. Co., 220 La. 696, 57 So.2d 405 (1952). The court stated that a sub-
vendee would have the right to sue the original vendor for a breach of the
implied contractual warranty of quality by application of Civil Code article
2503 which states: "The parties may, by particular agreement, add to the
obligation of warranty, which results of right from the sale, or diminish
its effect; they may even agree that the seller shall not be subject to any
warranty.
"But whether any warranty be excluded or not the buyer shall become
subrogated to the seller's rights and actions in warranty against all others."
(Emphasis added.)
This article, although found in the section of the Code dealing with
eviction, was applied to actions in redhibition by the civilian method of
extending principles by analogy. The buyer or subvendee is subrogated to
the rights of the seller or original vendee against the original vendor, so
that the subvendee's cause of action would be that of the original vendee.
If the original vendor was a manufacturer, it would be liable for damages
to the subvendee through the manufacturer's imputed knowledge of the
redhibitory vice. This dicta in McEachern, was cited with approval in
Russell v. Bartlett, 139 So.2d 770, 777 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961), but has never
been applied by any state court. The general rule requiring privity has been
rigidly adhered to. Ready v. Rhea, 222 So.2d 560 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1969).
The Fifth Circuit, in a review of the state's jurisprudence, stated that the
subrogation principle in McEachern had no foundation in Louisiana law.
Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 29 (5th Cir. 1963).
In France, the right to sue for breach of contractual warranty is
transmitted with the object of the sale. Some of the French decisions rely
on tort liability, but it is clear that the remedies of the code articles
dealing with redhibition are available to the subvendee as well as the im-
mediate vendee. The theory is that the vendee has transmitted to the sub-
vendee all the rights conferred upon the vendee in the original sale. Privity
of contract is no obstacle in France to an action for breach of the war-
ranty of quality. This cause of action is similar in theory to that available
through the principles of subrogation embodied in Louisiana Civil Code
article 2503. Pothier in his treatise states: "Beyond the case of a workman
or merchant, the vendor who does not know, or have any reason to know
or suspect that a redhibitory vice exists, is bound only to return the price...
and is not bound for the damage that the vice has caused to the buyer
in his other things. This is because if, instead of buying by casks from a
manufacturer or dealer, I buy them from an individual who had more than
he needed and some of them prove defective, he is bound to restore to me
only the price; he is not responsible for the loss of wine that results from
the defective condition of the casks.
"Dumoulin nevertheless, in his treatise, properly observes that such
individual should cede to me, at least, his rights and actions, if any, against
the cooper or dealer from whom he purchased the casks that he sold to me
in order that I. may exercise them in his place for my own account and
at my risk; because the sale that he has made to me should not operate
to the profit or advantage of the manufacturer who is the one at fault, and
discharge him of his obligation; and the individual is considered as having
ceded to me with the casks all the rights pertaining to them. But if I
exercise these rights of my vendor against the cooper I may not claim
of my vendor the restitution of the price." J. SMITH, LOUISIANA & COM-
PARATIVE MATERIAL ON SALES & LEAsEs 215 (1963). See also Morrow, Warranty
of Quality: A Comparative Survey, 14 TUL. L. Rsv. 529 (1940); Note, 14
TuL. L. REV. 470 (1940).
Another exception to the privity requirement was offered in Weather-
master Parts & Services, Inc. v. Mcaay, 242 So.2d 306, 309 (La. App. 4th
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principle that the vendee is entitled to goods which are free from
hidden vices or defects that render the thing sold either ab-
solutely useless, or its use so inconvenient or imperfect that it
must be supposed the vendee would not have purchased the
goods had he known of the vice." The vendee need only prove
that the product was not suited for the purpose intended,12 the
defect was present at the time of the sale,'8 and the defect was
not apparent.' 4 The vendor's liability is limited to return of the
purchase price and the expenses of the sale if he acted in good
faith. 15 On the other hand, if the vendor knows of the defect
before the sale, he is considered in bad faith and is responsible
for damages.' 6 The courts have imputed bad faith to a manu-
facturer on the theory that it has constructive knowledge of the
defect and is therefore liable for damages. 7 The presumption of
bad faith to the manufacturer in cases involving the warranty
of quality is similar to the presumption of fault in the delictual
warranty cases.
Prior to the instant case, the manufacturer's delictual war-
ranty could be asserted only in cases where the purchaser suf-
fered bodily injury as a result of unwholesome food products, 8
or when damage resulted from a product which involved a risk
of hazard in normal use.19 However, it would seem if the defec-
tive manufacture resulted only in a valueless article or in its
reduced value, privity would still be necessary because the
delictual warranty would not exist. Similarly, the privity require-
Cir. 1970): "It appears to us that a manufacturer's warranty [of quality]
is intended for the benefit of the ultimate consumer and makes him a
third-party beneficiary of the contract or original sale to a distributor ....
entitled to enforce the warranty obligation, C.C. Art. 1890, which is surely
part of the ultimate purchaser's motive for purchasing the manufacturer's
product." Neither the subrogation principle in McEachern, nor this excep-
tion to the privity requirement has been applied in subsequent cases.
11. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2520.
12. Passman v. Alexander, 4 So.2d 787 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1941); Hemen-
way, Inc. v. Roach, 175 So. 892 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
13. This can be shown by circumstantial evidence. McCauley v. Manda
Bros. Prov. Co., 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d 637 (1968).
14. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2521.
15. Id. art. 2531.
16. Id. art. 2545.
17. Radalec, Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 228 La. 116, 81 So.2d 830
(1955); Tuminello v. Mawby, 220 La. 733, 57 So.2d 666 (1952); George v.
Shreveport Cotton Oil Co., 114 La. 498, 38 So. 432 (1905); Johnson v. H.W.
Parson Motors, Inc., 231 So.2d 73 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970); Brown v. Dauzat,
157 So.2d 570 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
18. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
19. See text accompanying notes 7 & 8 8upra.
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ment would have to be satisfied where the defective product
did not present a risk of hazard. Thus, the basis of liability
would depend not only on the character of the product but also
the nature of the loss suffered. However, there is no reason
why the manufacturer's assurance of reasonable fitness should
attach only where the product caused extrinsic damage and
not where the product was merely defective. Also, it should
make no difference that the defect in the product would likely
harm the purchaser. The existence of the defect and resultant
loss results in "violation of the representation implicit in the
presence of the article in the stream of trade that it is suitable
for the general purposes for which it is sold and for which such
goods are generally appropriate."-'
In the instant case, the court has now allowed a purchaser
to maintain an action against a manufacturer for defective prod-
ucts without regard to the character of the product or type of
resulting loss.2 1 No longer is it necessary to distinguish between
extrinsic damage and a mere defect or to determine if the defec-
tive product presents a risk of hazard. All the plaintiff must
prove is the existence of the defect, from which negligence is
imputed to the manufacturer, and the causal relationship be-
tween that defect and the resultant loss of whatever sort.
22
It should be noted that the court not only expanded the
delictual warranty of the manufacturer but also the contractual
warranty of quality. Prior to Media, privity was a requirement
in all actions in redhibition where the warranty of quality had
been breached.2 Now the supreme court has abrogated the
privity requirement in any action founded on the manufacturer's
breach of the warranty. The privity requirement would, how-
ever, remain when the action in redhibition is directed against
20. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 67, 207 A.2d 305, 313
(1965).
21. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc.,
262 La. 80, 90-91, 262 So.2d 377, 381 (1972): "We see no reason why the
[consumer-protection] rule should not apply to the pecuniary loss resulting
from the purchase of a new automobile that proves unfit for use because
of latent defects."
22. One of the cases cited by the court in Media has an interesting
parallel to the instant case. In Santor v. A. & M. Karagheustan, Inc., 44
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965), the court held that the ultimate purchaser of
defective carpeting could maintain an action directly against the manu-
facturer for breach of warranty even though the loss was limited to the
value of the carpeting. The decision in Santor contains a detailed discussion
of the policy considerations involved in such a case.
23. See text accompanying notes 9-16 aupra.
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any seller other than the manufacturer. 24 Louisiana has now, as
the court in Media states, "aligned itself with the consumer-
protection rule .. ..,25
An extremely important aspect of the instant case is the
court's finding that the distributor occupied the position of a
manufacturer insofar as its liability is concerned. 2 Generally,
knowledge of a defect in a product is only imputed to its
manufacturer, thereby giving rise to liability.27 In the early cases
involving the manufacturer's liability in relation to food prod-
ucts, the courts consistently held that a distributor, who was
not the manufacturer or preparer, was not liable under the
warranty of wholesomeness.-2 However, since Penn v. Inferno
Manufacturing Corp.,29 an exception to this general rule has
been recognized. When a seller has labeled the goods as his
own, or in some way held the goods out to be manufactured
by him, then knowledge of the article's defect will be imputed
24. In a concurring opinion in Media, Justice Dixon offers an alternative
suggestion in relation to the contractual warranty of quality. Justice Dixon
states that by application of the subrogation principle embodied in Civil
Code article 2503 the plaintiff, subvendee, would be subrogated to the rights
and actions of the dealer, the immediate vendee, against the distributor,
the immediate vendor. See note 9 supra. Since the demand was only for the
return of the purchase price, there would be no necessity of finding the
distributor a manufacturer in order to insure recovery. Under the Code
articles dealing with redhibition, a vendee may always maintain an action
against the vendor for return of the purchase price and expenses of the
sale (article 2531). Therefore, by application of article 2503 this action
could be maintained. The only time a vendor must be considered a manu-
facturer would be to allow the plaintiff to receive damages in addition
to the purchase price and expenses of the sale. Perhaps in subsequent deci-
sions the court will offer the subrogation principle as another weapon to the
purchaser in addition to those available in Media. This principle would be
of special importance in a situation where the court could not classify the
distributor as a "manufacturer," and the demand was only for the purchase
price.
25. 262 La. at 90, 262 So.2d at 381.
26. Id. at 89-90, 262 So.2d at 380: "Insofar as the American consumer is
concerned, MBNA occupies the position of manufacturer. We hold, there-
fore, that the liability of MBNA to the American consumer is that of the
manufacturer of a defective vehicle."
27. See text accompanying notes 5, 8 & 16 supra.
28. Cartwright v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 254 La. 330, 223 So.2d 822 (1969);
McCauley v. Manda Bros. Prov. Co., 252 La. 528, 211 So.2d 637 (1968); Lesher
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 129 So.2d 96 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961). It should
be noted that other jurisdictions have found liability as a matter of public
policy. Since the retailer is in a superior position in experience when deal-
ing with the manufacturer and also in a better position to seek indemnity,
liability has been justified. Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221 (Fla.
1965); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Conmmer),
50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966).
29. 199 So.2d 210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
19731
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to him.80 Under the rationale in Penn, in order to hold the dis-
tributor liable for damages the plaintiff was required to show
that the distributor labeled the product as its own, advertised
it as its own, and that the plaintiff relied upon these advertise-
ments as an inducement to purchase the article."' However, in
the instant case the court found that the distributor occupied
the position of a manufacturer in spite of the fact that there
was no evidence to indicate that the distributor labeled the
product as its own, or advertised it as its own.3 2 The distributor
did assume responsibility for marketing the cars in this country,
and for selling, servicing, and establishing dealerships, and the
court thought this sufficient to find the distributor a "manu-
facturer."
Thus, the distributor's "manufacturer's" liability was based
upon its activities in relation to its marketing of the cars. There
is no reason why liability should only be contingent on overt
actions by the distributor. Distributors and retailers, like manu-
facturers, are engaged in the business of distribution of goods
to the public. Since all are an integral part of the producing
and marketing enterprises, they should bear the burden of
damages resulting from defective goods. In many cases, such
as the situation in Media, the distributor may be the only mem-
ber of the marketing enterprise which may be amenable to suit
by the ultimate purchaser. In reality, such liability results in
maximum protection to the innocent purchaser and works no
injustice to the defendant. The distributor or retailer may always
pass the loss to the manufacturer in the course of their continu-
ing business relationship. 3 The basis of finding such liability is
that of the special responsibility owed the public taken by one
who supplies the public with products and the forced reliance
upon those suppliers on the part of those who purchase such
goods.3 4 In future cases, the court should continue to expand the
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400, comment c (1965); accord,
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 256 So.2d 321 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971); see generally 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 100(3) (1966).
31. Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc.,
247 So.2d 266, 269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
32. Id.
33. For an excellent discussion of the policy involved in such a situation,
see Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964).
34. This liability Is suggested to apply to the manufacturer, wholesale
or retail dealer, distributor, and seller of food. It does not, however, apply
to the occasional seller, not engaged In that activity as a part of his
regular business. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A, comment f (1965).
[Vol. 33
1973] NOTES
"manufacturer's" liability to distributors and retailers without
the requirement of any actions other than those taken in the
course of their regular distribution of products.
Thomas F. Getten
ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN: THE GIDEON OF MISDEMEANORS?
Petitioner, an indigent unrepresented by counsel, was sen-
tenced to 90 days in jail for carrying a concealed weapon. In a
habeas corpus action, the Florida supreme court held that peti-
tioner had no right to court-appointed counsel, reasoning that
such right extends only to "trials for non-petty offenses punish-
able by more than six months' imprisonment."' The United
States Supreme Court reversed,2 holding no person may be
imprisoned for any offense, in a criminal case, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial or waived his right to counsel.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972).
The landmark case of Gideon v. WainwrightA held the right
to counsel for indigents, guaranteed by the sixth amendment,
is a fundamental right and therefore applicable to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Although Gideon involved a felony trial, the opinion repeatedly
referred to the rights of persons "charged with crime."' 4 In a
per curiam decision5 rendered shortly after Gideon, the Court
applied the Gideon rule to a "misdemeanor" offense punishable
by two years in prison although certiorari was subsequently
denied in two cases involving a state court's refusal to appoint
counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions.6
1. 236 So.2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1970).
2. An 8-0 decision, Justice Douglas writing the opinion, Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist concurring in result.
3. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. Id. at 344: "The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not
be fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in
ours."
5. Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963). The offenses involved carried
maximum terms of two years imprisonment, although labelled "misde-
meanors" under Maryland law. Patterson was remanded for further con-
sideration in light of Gideon and, on remand, the Maryland supreme court
reversed and remanded for trial with appointed counsel. Patterson v. State,
231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
6. Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); and DeJoseph v. Connecticut,
385 U.S. 982 (1966). Justice Stewart, dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in Winters, wrote: "I think this Court has a duty to resolve the conflict and
clarify the scope of Gideon v. Wainwright." 385 U.S. at 908. One year later,
